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Case Comments
Constitutional Law: Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Denied as to Documents Recovered by Taxpayer from His
Accountant and Transferred to His Attorney
A special agent of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) made
an appointment with taxpayers to discuss their tax liability for
the two previous years. The taxpayers retained an attorney who
informed the IRS that they would not keep the appointment.
Shortly thereafter, the taxpayers obtained from their accountant
all the tax records in his possession, primarily work papers which
he had compiled. These records were transferred within two
weeks to the taxpayers' attorney. Approximately five months
after this transfer, the IRS summoned the attorney to produce
the documents for use in the pending investigation.1 When the
attorney refused, the IRS commenced an enforcement action, in
which the district court ordered the documents produced.2 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 3 does not
protect an accountant's work papers possessed briefly by tax-
1. The summons was issued under the authority of INT. REV. CODE
or 1954, § 7602, which provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any re-
turn, making a return where none has been made, determining
the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the
liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of
any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting
any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized-(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data
which may be relevant or material to such inquiry; [and](2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to
perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or
any person having possession, custody, or care of books of
account containing entries relating to the business of the per-
son liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other
person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to ap-
pear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place
named in the summons and to produce such books, papers,
records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath,
as may be relevant or material to such inquiry ....
2. United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
3. Although the explicit language of the fifth amendment is lim-
ited to "any criminal case," it is well established that the privilege
against self-incrimination applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings
wherever the evidence sought might result in criminal responsibility.
See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34,40 (1924).
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payers and then delivered to their attorney.4 United States v.
Fisher, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. granted, 43
U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1975) (No. 18).
When the IRS commences an investigation, a taxpayer may
discover that many pertinent tax records are in the hands of his
accountant. The taxpayer or his attorney may need these records
in the preparation of a defense, while the IRS may seek to use
them in its investigation. In the recent case of Couch v. United
States,5 the Supreme Court addressed the question whether a
taxpayer must own such records and documents in order to suc-
cessfully assert a fifth amendment privilege. The Court sug-
gested that a taxpayer need only be in rightful possession of such
papers.6 Fisher is significant as the first lower court decision
to apply that standard of rightful possession. The significance
of the Fisher holding was underscored within a matter of weeks
by a decision in the Fifth Circuit on nearly identical facts.
Despite the precedent of Fisher, the taxpayer's fifth amendment
claim was allowed to prevail in United States v. Kasmir3
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
inherently personal. It protects persons, not property.8  This
4. It had also been argued that the summons was unenforceable
because it had been issued in aid of a criminal investigation, rather than
for any of the valid "civil' purposes specified in section 7602. The valid-
ity of such a defense had been recognized by the Supreme Court in Don-
aldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 526 (1971), and Reisman v. Caplin,
375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964). The court had no trouble disposing of this claim
on the basis of the holding in Donaldson that "an internal revenue sum-
mons may be issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith
and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution." 400 U.S. at
536. In Fisher, findings as to each criterion were made adversely to the
taxpayers by the district court. 352 F. Supp. at 733. Without extended
discussion, the court of appeals rejected the argument that, because no
agents from the Audit Division had been taking part in the investigation
at the time the summons was issued, the finding of good faith by the
district court was clearly erroneous. The burden of proof was on the
taxpayer and was not met merely by a showing of the Audit Division's
non-involvement. 500 F.2d at 687-88.
5. 409 U.S. 322 (1973). In Couch, an IRS special agent issued a
summons to an accountant seeking work papers relating to his client's
tax liability. The Supreme Court upheld the summons, despite the fact
that the accountant had transferred the work papers to the taxpayer, be-
cause the transfer had occurred after service of the summons. In re-
sponse to taxpayer's fifth amendment claim, based on her ownership of
the records, the Court held that the privilege could not prevail, because
the taxpayer had not been in possession of the disputed documents when
the summons was served.
6. Id. at 331.
7. 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3412
(U.S. Jan. 28, 1975) (No. 611).
8. Discussing the application of the fifth amendment privilege
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fact was made evident in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,9
where the Court enumerated the policies underlying the privi-
lege:
[The privilege] reflects many of our fundamental values and
most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those sus-
pected of crime to the cruel trilenrna of self-accusation, per-
jury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather
than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that
self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a
fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to
leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturb-
ing him and by requiring the government in its contest with
the individual to shoulder the entire load," 8 Wigmore, Evi-
dence (MeNaughton rev., 1961), 317; our respect for the in-
violability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life," United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 [2d Cir.
1956] (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd 353 U.S. 391 [1957]; our
distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that
the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often
"a protection to the innocent." Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S.
155, 162 [1955].1o
A taxpayer's claim that the policies enumerated in Murphy
should protect accountant work papers can arise in four different
factual situations: (1) the taxpayer both owns and possesses the
papers at the time he is served with a summons; (2) the taxpayer
possesses documents owned by his accountant when the summons
is served; (3) the taxpayer neither owns nor possesses the papers
when the summons is served, but the papers have been in his
possession at one time; and (4) the taxpayer does not own the
papers and has never been in actual possession of them.
The validity of the fifth amendment claim in the first factual
situation, when ownership and possession converge in the tax-
payer, has not been in doubt since Boyd v. United States" was
decided in 1886. The Supreme Court's rationale in Boyd, which
involved the compulsory production of private books and papers
for use in a forfeiture proceeding, was that the privilege against
self-incrimination, although historically associated with oral tes-
timony, was never intended to be limited to oral declarations.
The Court found no meaningful distinction between compelling
a man to give oral testimony against himself and seizing his pri-
specifically to books and records, Justice Holmes once stated that "a
party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its produc-
tion." Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
9. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
10. Id. at 55.
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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vate books and papers to use as evidence against him.1 2
The fifth amendment issue in the second factual situation,
when the taxpayer possesses but does not own disputed docu-
ments, was decided by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Cohen.13 In Cohen, work papers owned by
the taxpayer's accountant were transferred to the taxpayer after
the initiation of an IRS investigation. When the taxpayer re-
fused to produce the papers in response to an IRS summons, the
court upheld his fifth amendment claim. In accordance with the
historic characterization of the privilege as personal, the court
stated:
[I] t is possession of papers sought by the government, not own-
ership, which sets the stage for exercise of the governmental
compulsion which it is the purpose of the privilege to prohibit.
The "cruel trilemma" of perjury, contempt, or self-incrimina-
tion, of which the Court spoke in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, faces the individual whenever the government seeks to
compel him to produce papers in his possession, for he must
then either falsify, accept punishment for contempt, or yield.
Lack of title does not free him from this choice.14
The position taken in Cohen was expressly approved by the
Supreme Court in Couch v. United States.'5 The Court stated
that "possession [not ownership] bears the closest relationship
to the personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amend-
ment."' 6 In reaching this conclusion the Court emphasized no-
tions both of personal compulsion and of the taxpayer's legiti-
mate expectations of privacy.' 7 The clear implication of this
reasoning is that a taxpayer should be afforded fifth amendment
protection whenever he is in possession of disputed papers, re-
gardless of who owns the papers.
This general principle does not apply, however, when the
court finds that the taxpayer's possession is wrongful or that the
12. Id. at 633. The Boyd opinion has been severely criticized for
its misplaced reliance on the fourth amendment protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., Schrock & Welsh, Up from
Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59
lMNN. L. Rsv. 251, 282-85 n.97 (1974). Boyd, like Couch and Fisher, in-
volved the failure to respond to compulsory process: there was neither
a search nor a seizure in any ordinary sense of those terms. Despite the
ambivalence of the opinion, however, the holding of Boyd clearly should
be applicable in any pure fifth amendment context. See Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638-
41 (1886) (Miller, J., concurring on the basis of the fifth amendment
alone).
13. 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
14. Id. at 468.
15. 409 U.S. 322, 330 n.12 (1973).
16. Id. at 331.
17. Id. at 336.
[Vol. 59:751
CASE COMMENTS
transfer of records from his accountant has been effected in bad
faith. For example, it is well established that if, before a sum-
mons is issued, a taxpayer owes a duty to his accountant to
return papers, his "wrongful possession" is not protected by the
fifth amendment.' 8 Similarly, when a taxpayer attempts to
thwart a subpoena by a "midnight hour" recovery of work papers
from his accountant, it has been held that his fifth amendment
rights are outweighed by the government's need to conduct an
investigation in good faith.19 Such exceptions reaffirm rather
than reject the rightful possession test advanced by Cohen and
Couch.2 0
In the third factual situation, the taxpayer, at the time of
service, has neither ownership nor possession of disputed papers,
although he has possessed them at one time. It might appear
that the traditional rationales of the fifth amendment privilege
do not apply to such a case, because the taxpayer himself is not
the focus of "governmental compulsion"2 ' in the quest for evi-
dence. Such reasoning, however, fails to recognize that govern-
mental compulsion exerted against a taxpayer's attorney could
be equivalent to compulsion against the taxpayer himself. For
example, in United States v. Judson,22 where a taxpayer's at-
torney possessed records in order to represent his client in a
pending investigation, the attorney successfully asserted the fifth
amendment privilege on the taxpayer's behalf. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit stated that "[n] o other 'third party,'
18. Such a situation has arisen when, prior to the issuance of a sum-
mons to the taxpayer, the accountant haa requested the return of the pa-
pers. See Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United
States v. Riland, 364 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); iUnited States v. Pizzo,
260 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see United States v. Cohen, 388
F.2d 464, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1967), where the court noted that, in light of
the rationale preferring mere possession to ownership, wrongful posses-
sion might be enough to support the privilege.
19. In United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968), the
court upheld a summons seeking accountant work papers in the posses-
sion of a taxpayer. Critical to the court's decision was the fact that two
prior subpoenas seeking the same papers had been unsuccessfully issued
to the taxpayer's accountant. In response to the first subpoena, the ac-
countant's attorney requested time in which to determine his client's re-
sponsibilities and the papers were not surrendered. A second subpoena
was then issued, but it also was not complied with on the ground that
it was erroneously dated one month in advance. On these facts, the court
held that, because the transfer from the accountant had been effected in
bad faith, the taxpayer was illegally thwarting a government investiga-
tion by withholding the papers.
20. See text accompanying notes 6 and 14 supra.
21. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
22. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
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nor 'agent,' nor 'representative' stands in such a unique relation-
ship between the accused and the judicial process as does his
attorney."23  Apparently bringing sixth amendment considera-
tions to bear on the fifth amendment issue, the court noted that
"[t]he very nature of the tax laws requires taxpayers to rely
upon attorneys, and requires attorneys to rely, in turn, upon doc-
umentary indicia of their clients' financial affairs."24 In In re
House,25 on facts nearly identical to those in Judson, the tax-
payer's attorney was allowed to assert the taxpayer's privilege
in the latter's absence. The court observed that the burdens of
time and expense that would have been involved in attending
hearings and investigations virtually prohibited the taxpayer
from asserting the fifth amendment privilege himself.26
The result in Judson and House was reinforced by the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Couch.27 The Court stated:
We do indeed believe that actual possession of documents bears
the most significant relationship to Fifth Amendment protec-
tions against governmental compulsions upon the individual
accused of crime. Yet situations may well arise where construc-
tive possession is so clear ... as to leave the personal com-
pulsions upon the accused substantially intact.28
Fisher and United States v. Kasmir29 involved examples of
the third factual situation. In both cases the taxpayer trans-
ferred tax records to his attorney after having been in possession
of them only briefly. In both cases the attorney subsequently
asserted a fifth amendment privilege on behalf of his client-
successfully in Kasmir, unsuccessfully in Fisher. This conflict
between the circuits3" is aggravated by the fact that the tax-
23. Id. at 467. The court added that "[the attorney and his client
are so identical with respect to the function of the evidence and to the
proceedings which call for its production that any distinction is mere so-
phistry." Id.
24. Id. at 468.
25. 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
26. For an alternative approach to the third factual situation, based
on the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship, see Petersen,
Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal Revenue Service Investigations, 54
ivhNN. L. REV. 67, 84-91 (1969).
27. Concerned with the less intimate relationship between the tax-
payer and his accountant, the Couch Court based its rejection of con-
structive possession on the accountant's independent status and his con-
tinuous possession of the records over a period of 14 years. 409 U.S. at
334-35.
28. Id. at 333.
29. 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3412
(U.S. Jan. 28, 1975) (No. 611).
30. Presumably in recognition of this conflict in the courts of ap-
peals, the Supreme Court has consolidated Fisher and Kasmir in granting
certiorari. 43 U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1975) (Nos. 18 & 611).
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payers in Fisher had retained the documents for nearly two
weeks, whereas the taxpayer's period of actual possession in Kas-
mir had been only a matter of minutes.
In the fourth factual situation, the taxpayer neither owns
the disputed papers when the summons is served nor has ever
had actual possession of them. The logic of Judson and House31
demands that in this situation the result be no different from
that where the taxpayer has had brief possession. 32 Otherwise,
constitutional protection would be relegated to the level of
ritual-afforded where the taxpayer obtains actual possession
even for a matter of moments before passing documents to his
attorney, but denied where the formality of such a two-step
transfer is omitted. Nevertheless, in United States v. White,3 3
where tax records had been transferred by the taxpayer's ac-
countant directly to the attorney, the taxpayer's claim of privi-
lege was denied by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.34
Thus, in the Fifth Circuit, the privilege against self-incrimination
is recognized when a taxpayer obtains brief actual possession of
records, as in Kasmir, but not when actual possession is wholly
lacking, as in White.
Drawing the line still more harshly, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has refused in Fisher to extend fifth amend-
ment protection even to a taxpayer whose attorney possesses
records for him after a brief possession in the taxpayer himself.
In Fisher, the court initially stated:
To be successful... appellants must convince us of the validity
of two propositions: First, if the [taxpayers] had not given the
"analyses" to [their attorney], they could have successfully
resisted the summons because the documents sought would have
been in a rightful personally privileged possession, and, second,
the [taxpayers] should not be held to have lost their privilege
solely because they surrendered actual possession to [their
attorney] for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in connection
with the investigation.35
The first proposition, the question of "rightful personally privi-
leged possession," should have posed no difficulty. Actual pos-
session for nearly two weeks was undisputed. The second proposi-
tion should have raised the precise issue whether, after the trans-
31. See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
32. Indeed, the facts of both Judson and House are properly classi-
fied within the fourth factual situation. In each case the requested doc-
uments had been given directly to the taxpayer's attorney.
33. 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir.), affd on rehearing, 487 F.2d 1335 (1973).
34. The court stated that it did not find the "necessary ingredient
of personal compulsion" required by Couch. 477 F.2d at 763.
35. 500 F.2d at 689.
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fer to the taxpayers' attorney, the taxpayers remained in con-
structive possession of the documents. According to Judson and
House, the unique relationship between an attorney and his client
requires that constructive possession be recognized upon such a
transfer to an attorney. Nevertheless, the Fisher court aban-
doned the two-part analysis it had initially invoked and pro-
ceeded along quite different lines:
[I]f the taxpayers are to succeed in their effort, they must
prove that their brief experience of actual possession for a
limited purpose coupled with turning their accountant's records
over to their attorney has the legal capacity to generate a subse-
quent right of constructive possession of sufficient intensity
to elevate those records into the required category of their
"private books and papers." We are unwilling to attribute
a Fifth Amendment protection to the accountant's work based
on such a limited possession by his client.3 6
The court thus "coupled"--and thereby confused-the dis-
tinct issues of actual possession and constructive possession. This
led the court to resist the clear implication of the taxpayer's
actual possession, merely because it had been "brief" and "for
a limited purpose." But according to Couch, a taxpayer need
demonstrate only a bare act of actual possession. Nowhere in
the Couch opinion is a taxpayer's possession required to be of
substantial duration or for an unlimited purpose in order to con-
stitute privileged actual possession. To be sure, Couch used the
terms "temporary and insignificant,"3 7 but it used them to
describe a "relinquishment of possession ' 38 so temporary and in-
significant that constructive possession would be retained. The
Fisher court seized the language but ignored the context, thereby
reaching the curious conclusion that the taxpayers' possession for
two weeks could not be privileged actual possession. It was then
of course unnecessary for the court to inquire seriously whether
the taxpayers' privilege would have survived the transfer to their
attorney. And it was unnecessary to confront the implications
of the unique attorney-client relationship, which had been crucial
in Judson and House. Indeed the draftsman of the court's opin-
ion betrayed his inattention to such implications when he re-
ferred to the taxpayers as "the accountant's ... client," thereby
obscuring their important status as the attorney's client.30
36. Id. at 692 (emphasis added).
37. 409 U.S. at 333.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Judge Hunter recognized this distortion of the issues in his
thoughtful dissent. He asserted that:
As I read the majority, whether there was rightful posses-
sion in a purely personal capacity or whether the personal com-
pulsions on the [taxpayers] were left intact notwithstanding
[Vol. 59:751
CASE COMMENTS
A better approach would have been to focus on the personal
nature of the fifth amendment privilege heralded notably in
Murphy,40 the taxpayer's legitimate expectations of privacy em-
phasized in Couch,4 1 and the impact of the distinctive attorney-
client relationship on that expectation of privacy. An analysis
based on these factors would resolve the fifth amendment issue
as applied to accountant work papers, regardless of whether the
taxpayer or his attorney is in possession of the papers.
If the taxpayer has actual possession, a presumption should
be raised that the privilege against self-incrimination inheres.
Subject only to the exceptions for wrongful possession and "mid-
night hour" transfers,42 this presumption should not be rebut-
table. Such a presumption is supported by both Cohen4" and
Couch.44
If the attorney has possession, Judson and House dictate that
a presumption should exist in favor of constructive possession. 45
The presumption should be independent of whether the taxpayer
has ever obtained actual possession of the papers himself before
passing them to his attorney. A constitutional right should not
hinge on such matters of ritual when an attorney has possession
of documents in order to better represent a taxpayer. This pre-
sumption should also be rebuttable only in the case of wrongful
possession or a "midnight hour" transfer.
If this analysis had been employed, Fisher would have been
decided differently. A presumption of constructive possession
would have been raised, and since there was no showing of
wrongful possession or a "midnight hour" transfer,46 a fifth
amendment privilege would have been recognized.4 7 In refusing
the transference of the "analyses" are questions which need
not be reached, if the documents possessed by the [taxpayers]
did not "have the capacity of coming within the penumbra of
the Boyd . . . rule." . . . If this is a statement of the holding
in this case, I find it unhelpful and fear that it will create
uncertainty for lower courts seeking to interpret it.
500 F.2d at 700.
40. 378 U.S. at 55. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
41. 409 U.S. at 336.
42. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
43. 388 F.2d at 468.
44. 409 U.S. at 333.
45. See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
46. The summons was served on the accountant after the transfer
of the documents to the taxpayers. 500 F.2d at 685. See note 5 supra
and notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
47. While Kasmir was correctly decided under this analysis, the law
in the Fifth Circuit is tainted by the anomalous precedent of White,
which recognizes ritual as dispositive. See notes 33-34 supra and accom-
panying text.
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to reach the question of constructive possession, the Fisher court
deviated from the analysis of Couch, upon which it had ostensibly
based its decision. By this juristic sleight-of-hand, the court not
only refused to help delineate the doctrine of constructive pos-
session, but also distorted the one aspect of the problem pre-
viously settled to a point of comprehensibility, the principle that
rightful actual possession is enough.
